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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the politics of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through an analysis of the rail 
sector in several countries. It starts from the premise that state-owned enterprises are created as a 
result of politics but the political conditions and settings may change over time, which result in 
different types of public ownership and state support.  Studies which explore the politics of SOEs 
often take several political perspectives, some critical of the performance of SOEs, others supportive 
of their wider socio-economic functions.  This is an indication of the highly politicised nature of SOEs 
and hints at the complexity of analysing and understanding the politics of SOEs which are essentially 
created as a result of political decisions.  Much of the literature on the changing role of the state has 
been developed in Europe and North America but many of the same processes can be seen across the 
world. These influence the political processes within which SOEs have to operate.   
 
In order to explore some of the specific politics of SOEs, the rail sector has been chosen as a way of 
understanding some of the processes that result in the evolution of SOEs and what contributes to a 
‘politics of SOEs’. The rail sector provides a public service which contributes to economic and social 
development through the transporting of people and goods. It requires investment in infrastructure 
which the state has traditionally provided.  The rail sector has an increasingly international dimension 
and this illustrates how SOEs are becoming part of a global sector (OECD, 2016). 
 
Four case studies of France, Germany, Great Britain and China have been developed as a way of 
exploring how the rail sector has been strongly influenced by SOEs and why national and local level 
politics influence the process of state-owned enterprise management.  Many of these processes are 
constantly evolving but not necessarily in a systematic way.  The four countries have been chosen for 
several reasons.  All have rail sectors which have been influenced by national public policies towards 
public ownership.  France and Germany retain SOEs in the rail sector and it is ironic that these SOEs 
have also benefitted from privatisation in other countries, by successfully winning contracts to run 
privatised rail services.  This has made them global companies. In the UK there is a mixed 
arrangement of SOEs in the rail sector with Great Britain having a privatised system with government 
control and Northern Ireland a state-enterprise rail system, an example of how regional issues affect 
rail policy.  Three of the case study countries are in Europe and show some of the differential impacts 
of European Union legislation.  China has a much stronger tradition of SOEs but has had to modify 
some if its SOE policies in the last few decades.  However, the use of SOEs in rail and infrastructure 
are part of an international policy which aims to secure Chinese influence globally. 
 
Starting with an overview of recent literature into SOEs, this chapter aims to answer three research 
questions: 
1. Why have state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played an important role in the rail sector in 
several countries? 
2. How have national and regional politics influenced the development of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the rail sector? 
3. How do public policies which have informed the rail sector reflected debates in contemporary 
politics, e.g. privatisation or public ownership? 
  
 
2. Overview of the development of state-owned enterprises 
 
There is a diverse literature on changes that have taken place in the position of SOEs over the last 
century. The origins of SOEs lay in an increased role of the state in the economy.  Other public 
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policies, such as regional and social development, innovation and security issues, have also supported 
the development of SOEs. The failure of the private sector to provide a reliable service is one of the 
main reasons why the state takes over a previously private-run service and creates a state-owned 
enterprise.  The last three decades have seen some fundamental changes in the way in which the state 
operates and the role that it plays in the economy and these have affected the way in which SOEs are 
treated politically.  This chapter will start with an overview of some of the factors that have shaped 
SOEs. 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), local or central government took over utilities companies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century at a time when industrial development required a secure supply 
of energy and water for factories and for local populations.  In both the UK and France, industries 
were nationalised after the Second World War as part of a wider policy of nationalisation triggered by 
the creation of the Welfare State and a recognition that the state had to play a more active role in 
economic growth. The failure of the private sector in several sectors, the Depression and the Second 
World War, which led to a recognition of the importance of national planning, were all factors that led 
to a growth in state-owned enterprises. Much French nationalisation after 1945 was a response to 
national security issues highlighted by the Second World War.   
 
Public enterprises have been identified with strategies for social and political unification and 
promoting economic development (Millward 2011).  After 1960, newly formed Canadian provinces 
established public enterprises as a means of stimulating regional economic development (Bernier 
2011). Support for industries such as iron and steel, coal which provided employment in regional 
economies was a strong influence on government policies towards SOEs in several countries, for 
example, France and the United Kingdom. 
 
Countries in Latin America established public enterprises as part of an import-substitution model of 
economic development during the twentieth century (Hirschman 1968).  With time, the maintenance 
of these industries became a political issue which led to lobbying of government by both labour and 
capital. Government policies towards SOEs must also be considered in this context.  The impact of 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies of public sector reform led to the 
privatisation of many SOEs in Latin America although Brazil, Peru, Chile and Colombia still maintain 
major state-owned enterprises (Chavez and Torres, 2014). More recently the rise of left-wing 
governments has resulted in a reframing of the role of state-owned enterprises in sectors such as 
renewable energy which are part of a wider change in participatory politics (Chavez, 2018, Conaghan, 
2015). 
 
State-owned enterprises played an important role in the economic and social development of China 
after 1949.  They provided services, employment and a range of social benefits such as health care, 
education, retirement protection (Fan and Hope, 2013).  SOEs have been described as a “collective of 
political entities for mass mobilisation, the production arm of state bureaucracy and social welfare 
providers for local communities” (Fan and Hope, 2013:7).  They were managed by factory managers 
who were also party members and state bureaucrats and so accountable to several constituencies, 
including the Communist Party and government departments.  Promotion depended on meeting 
political objectives and so they had to be able to operate in a political context. 
 
In a similar way to many other countries, external factors created pressures for privatisation.  The 
World Bank exerted an indirect influence on governance reforms of SOEs mediated by the Chinese 
government.  The Chinese Communist Party has been an important stakeholder in this process 
(Modell and Yang, 2017).  Government reforms attempted to increase the financial viability of SOEs 
without any supporting institutional changes and so changes did not take place. As part of China’s 
entry into the WTO it was required to introduce competition between SOEs and foreign companies.  
Reforms were introduced to improve efficiency and effectiveness of SOEs but privatisation was not 
promoted as a specific strategy (Shi, 2007). 
 
2.1 Public-private boundaries 
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Another issue that emerges from a review of public enterprises is that it is becoming more difficult to 
define clear boundaries between the public and private sector.  The process of corporatisation of 
public enterprises has created companies operating with business principles within the public sector 
(Bognetti and Obermann, 2012). One major difference may be whether a company is profit-seeking 
but there are also not-for profit corporations, which re-invest profits into their activities.   
 
A 2017 OECD analysis identified four main types of SOEs: 
• Majority owned listed entities – majority owned by government; 
• Minority owned listed entities – minority owned by government;  
• Majority owned non-listed entities – Government majority owned and non-listed; 
• Statutory corporations and quasi-corporations – legal entity separate from owners (OECD, 
2017). 
 
There are extensive variations between countries but the different types of SOE arrangements can be 
seen as a reflection of how different interest groups have both influenced and been affected by 
attempts at privatisation or corporatisation.  Government minority stakes can be a way of government 
withdrawing, although not completely, from an SOE but the continuation of majority government 
holdings in both listed and non-listed companies, reflects continued government control. The 
establishment of government or quasi-government arms-length corporations as corporatized SOEs are 
another form of government control.  All these different forms reflect a more business-focused 
environment for SOEs but not necessarily less government influence.  The many ways in which the 
private sector is involved in the public sector creates another level of complexity. This may be 
through contracting of services, such as facilities management, or through public-private partnerships. 
 
Bruton et al (2015) argue that the concept of a hybrid organisation is becoming a more appropriate 
way to analysing the varying degrees of involvement of the state in SOEs. For example, 
municipalities were traditionally responsible for waste management collection.  Changes in the nature 
of the waste management industry, with the creation of vertically integrated structures of collection, 
treatment and disposal and the trading of waste management services had led to changes in the way in 
which companies operate.  A recent study found that some of the most successful waste management 
companies, which are able to challenge multi-national companies have their origins in municipal 
enterprises.  The companies may now have been partially privatised and integrated with energy and 
other utilities (Antonioli and Massarutto 2012). 
 
2.2 Regulatory structures 
Public enterprises can be classified in terms of the products and services, which they produce or 
deliver but another form of classification can be the influence of internal or quasi-markets on public 
enterprises.  Internal or quasi-markets are created by setting up a commissioning function, responsible 
for strategic management, which commissions services from providers, which can be public and 
private enterprises.  An immediate issue facing quasi-markets or internal markets is how to create an 
effective regulatory function, which may be part of the public sector but is also responsible for 
regulating public enterprises. Another issue is how a regulator contributes to meeting the changing 
needs of public services.  Farazmand (2012) discusses the development of the regulatory state as a 
reaction to the failure of privatisation and the excesses of the corporate sector.  
 
A brief review of the literature on public services such as water, public transport and waste 
management in Europe shows that the nature of the public service has some influence on how public 
enterprises function and the regulatory structures that have been put in place In Europe.  For example, 
in local public transport, no clear new model of regulation and provision has emerged in Europe. 
Local public transport services are considered so complex that full outsourcing is often not possible.  
Some countries have kept the different transport functions within the public sector.  Several countries 
have evolved a form of external regulation but maintained either municipal or regional transport 
companies, which have been corporatized (Zatti 2012). 
 
4 
 
The continued existence and evolution of public enterprises has important implications for the future 
of policies for privatisation and public sector reform.  If public enterprises are operating successfully 
then is privatisation necessary?   Bernier (2011) argued that governments should attempt to reform the 
governance of public enterprises rather than privatise them.  This also contributes to a reworking of 
the nature of the state, in that moving from the Welfare State to a more market-orientated state, 
requires the state to take a different approach to the processes of managing and regulating public 
enterprises.   
 
3. Changing role of state in the economy 
 
The overall change to the state since the 1980s has been conceptualised as a move from a tax based, 
interventionist state to a contractual, regulatory, debt state to a Consolidation state.  The indebtedness 
of states has increased since the 1980s, with some stabilisation after the 1990s, but continuing after 
2008 and this has had an increasing influence on the form of the state.  The transformation of the state 
is a continual process and as it has evolved through these stages, the relationships between the state 
and SOEs changed, not necessarily leading to a reduced state role but rather to a more complex set of 
relationships.  The politics of SOEs can be seen as a reflection of how this complexity is played out at 
national and local levels.   
  
Changes in the form of the state introduced a new way of operating for the state, which changed from 
being a tax/ interventionist state to an enabling state (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; King, 1997). This 
process led to the conceptualisation of the State as a “hollowed out” or managerial state (Rhodes, 
1994).  More specifically, it was seen to be “hollowed out” from above, by the EU and its 
liberalisation agenda and from within through a process of marketization and corporatisation 
(Sketcher, 2000).  These changes also led to public policies being created for and with a stronger 
private sector influence (Rhodes, 1994; Rhodes, 1997).   
 
In order to function as a quasi-market, public sector institutions were subject to a process known as 
corporatisation and had to operate within business objectives, aiming to make a profit, working to 
targets and new quality standards. This affected SOEs and has led to the process of corporatisation in 
which SOEs operate as businesses operating with market forces. The state had to take on new roles.  
In order to secure the quality of public services which were not being delivered by the state, quality 
standards, new regulatory agencies and regular inspections were introduced (Neave, 1998; Hood et al, 
1999; Moran, 2003; King, 2007).  What had started as a “hollowing out” of the state, with the state no 
longer the sole provider of public services, evolved into the state taking on a “regulatory” and 
“evaluative” role, almost replacing its role as service provider.  This also led to governments changing 
their relationships with SOEs. 
 
The concept of the regulatory state has its origins in the United States with the development of rule-
making, bureaucratic processes of the administrative state and is associated with the expansion of 
outsourcing and privatisation (Levi-Faur, 2011).  Majone (2010) considered the main function of the 
regulatory state to be to correct market failures. The regulatory functions of government are separated 
from policy making as the regulatory agencies are outside government.  Accountability is taken away 
from government and assigned to less democratic institutions. Levi-Faur (2011) defined the regulatory 
state as a state that applies and extends rule-making, monitoring and enforcement via bureaucratic 
organs of the state (Hood et al, 1999; Levi-Faur, 2011).  The creation of an audit culture and different 
ways of measuring performance were introduced throughout the public sector (Neave, 1998; Moran, 
2004) and affected SOEs.  Ultimately, as the State developed relationships with a range of providers, 
not just SOEs, a complex new bureaucracy was created (Skelcher, 2000).  The nature of the state in 
this period of growing relational complexity has been called the ‘congested’ or entrepreneurial state. 
This can be seen in the relationship between government and SOEs which were characterised by 
greater insertion in the market yet subject to regulatory structures. 
 
Perotti and Bertolotti (2005) examined the changing role of the state in the economy specifically in 
relation to the management of SOEs, raising the question about the self-interest of government.  A 
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politician’s perspective if most often short term and may also be subject to corruption with SOEs 
being managed in return for political favours.  Perotti and Bertolotti (2005) are critical of the role of 
regulatory governance and how it has influenced the privatisation of SOEs.  They suggest that there 
will not be enough public scrutiny “to ensure public attention to public welfare” (Perotti and 
Bertolotti, 2005:7). They argue that state control of SOEs is more difficult in countries with weaker 
institutional arrangements, often assumed to be many low/ medium income countries.  They 
recommend a more democratic, elected approach, with more public involvement in the regulatory 
process. 
 
These phases of change of the role of the state affected SOEs in several ways and in varying degrees 
in different countries.  Although founded by the state as part of a more interventionist role in the 
economy, SOEs found themselves operating under a more critical regime after the 1980s when 
privatisation was introduced.  Some SOEs were privatised but there has not been a simple process of 
transfer from SOE to private enterprise.  The nature of the state is continuing to change. The extent to 
which this process has resulted in the continued survival of SOEs has been affected by several factors, 
for example, the way in which the industry/ sector has been considered as a strategic priority for 
governments.   Often, even if SOEs were not privatised, they were exposed to competition by being 
included in internal markets.  The process of corporatisation where the state remains a shareholder has 
been a more dominant process than full privatisation of SOEs (Finger and Laperrouza, 2011), 
although a recent OECD survey (2017) shows that even this remains a finely grained process from 
country to country. 
 
The concept of the Consolidation State (Streeck 2016, Clifton et al, 2018)) has been developed to 
explain some of the changes in the role of the state that have taken place since the global financial 
crisis in 2008.  Many governments nationalised banks to save the banking sector and this left them 
with an increased level of indebtedness.  Since the 1980s, countries had been competing with each 
other to attract corporations and high income earners by offering low tax rates.  This led to a reduction 
in tax revenues and increased indebtedness (Streeck, 2016:116).  The increase in borrowing was also 
related to globalisation and facilitated the process of financialisation which enabled capital to be 
borrowed through a wider range of products.  Governments were not immediately pressured to reduce 
their indebtedness and financial services became some of the fastest growing sectors in many 
countries.  
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 weakened the position of indebted governments.  Financial markets 
wanted to be reassured that governments had their long term debt under control.  Austerity policies 
were introduced by many governments as a way of reducing public expenditure, with the aim of 
reducing the role and size of the state in the economy.  This new phase in the form of the state created 
a more hostile environment for SOEs although the extent to which SOEs are providing strategic 
services continues to influence the politics of SOEs.   
 
Initial attempts to either privatise or subject SOEs to greater competition was motivated by a political 
belief that private sector was more efficient than the public sector and that public services would be 
more effectively delivered by the private sector.  There is growing evidence to show that this is not 
true (Bel et al, 2011).  Another theme to emerge from this research was the relatively uneven impact 
of these economic reforms (Clifton et al 2011; Florio and Fecher, 2011; Bognetti and Obermann, 
2012, Bernier, 2011).  Rentsch and Finger (2015) examined the relationships between the state and 
SOEs in three countries (France, Germany and Switzerland) and found that SOEs wanted a 
combination of a close relationship and a more distant one with government in order to secure their 
goals of retaining subsidies but retaining competition opportunities.  Governments wanted a close 
relation to guarantee service delivery but a more distanced relationship to be an effective regulator.  
There are several factors that seem to influence the way in which governments respond to SOEs in 
recent decades.  Strategic sectors, key infrastructure services, employment and security issues all 
contribute to some of the decisions which have been made by government in relation to SOEs 
(Millward, 2011). However, after over thirty years of privatisation and public sector reform, state-
owned or public enterprises are still an important force in many economies.  In Brazil, China and 
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Russia, the emerging economies, state-owned enterprises are playing a significant role in the economy 
(Economist 2011).  In Europe, there are a wide range of public enterprises that have survived during a 
period of privatisation and liberalisation. 
 
Some of these arguments will be explored by examining the role of SOEs in the rail sector in France, 
Germany and China where the rail sector remains state-owned and the United Kingdom (UK), where 
government influence continues to play an important role despite extensive privatisation.  The case 
studies are structured as follows: 
1. Context of state-owned enterprises 
2. The development of a rail state-owned enterprises 
3. The politics of rail state-owned enterprises 
 
4. France 
 
4.1 Context of state-owned enterprises 
In France, central and regional government continue to play a key role in the management of SOEs.  
The establishment and continued control of SOEs has been influenced by several factors, including 
security, strategic sectors, industrialisation and social policies.  France has over 2.5 million workers 
employed in four types of SOEs (OECD, 2017) (Table 1).  There are four types of SOE in France, 
with minority-owned listed companies and state/quasi state corporations employing about 80% of the 
SOE workforce.  37.5% of workers are employed in the transport sector indicating the importance of 
state-owned enterprises in this sector.  
 
Table 1: Number of employees and number of enterprises in SOEs in France 
Workers (enterprises) 
 
 Majority 
owned listed  
Minority 
owned listed 
 Majority 
owned non 
listed 
Statutory 
corporations/ 
quasi 
corporations 
Total 
employment 
Total 
employees 
165,477 (3) 954,245 (11) 308,109 1,109,915 (20) 2,537,746 
(100%) 
Manufacturing  -- 403,498 (5) 20,034 (9) 484 (1) 424,016 
(16.7%) 
Finance - 8,215 (2) 142 (6) - 8,357 
(0.003%) 
Telecoms - 163,545 (1) - - 163,545 
(6.4%) 
Electricity and 
gas 
154,730 (1) 278,243 (2) - - 432,973 
(17%) 
Transport 9,035 (1) 100,744 (1) 377 (11) 842,813 (14) 952,959 
(37.5%) 
Other activities 1,712 (real 
estate) 
- 285,279 + 207 
(real estate) 
(8) 
266,618 (3) 553,816 
(21.8%) 
Source: OECD, 2017  
 
French government policies towards strategic SOEs have been influenced by both short and long term 
issues (Cohen, 2010). More recent changes and consolidation in the government management of 
SOEs has been influenced by a government decision in March 2010, which stated that the objectives 
of SOEs were to be directed “toward making an active contribution to the government’s industrial and 
social policies” (OECD, 2011). To oversee this policy, a Commissioner for SOE, reporting to the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance, was appointed in August 2010 to oversee this policy (OECD 
2011).  The head of the state ownership agency, Agence des Participations de l’Etat (APE), continues 
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to report to the Treasury.  SOE boards are made up of one third employee representatives, one third 
state representatives and one third independent directors (OECD, 2011).  The number of 
representatives has been reduced from 33 to 18 since 2005. SOEs have been encouraged to set up 
audit, strategy and remuneration committees (OECD, 2011). 
 
4.2 SNCF – the development of a state-owned enterprise 
The example of the French rail company, SNCF, shows how the French government has managed a 
key strategic industry over several decades, balancing economic and social factors. SNCF is 100% 
owned by the French government and runs almost all of the French rail system, including the High 
Speed Train (HGV) but it is also a global company, operating in Europe, Asia and the Americas.  76% 
of its revenues still come from activities in France. 
 
The Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français (SNCF) was formed in 1938, with the 
nationalisation of France's five main railway companies, as a public-private company.  The 
government took 51% of the ownership and the company was to be managed as ‘an industrial 
business with a public service mission’ (SNCF, 2017).  After the Second World War, rail transport 
was considered essential for economic growth.  In 1983, SNCF became a fully state- owned 
enterprise, with the French government having 100% ownership, part of the nationalisation 
programme of the Mitterand government.  
 
Following an EU Directive (91/440) in 1997 to separate out the running of railways from management 
of infrastructure, which aimed to introduce competition into the rail system, the track and signals were 
run by a separate company, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF).  This is an example of the influence of 
EU liberalisation policies on SOEs.  SNCF managed trains and circulation on behalf of Réseau Ferré 
de France (RFF), which was also a SOE.  In January 2015, as a result of the merger between RFF, 
SNCF Infra and the Division of Railway Traffic Management (DCF), SNCF Réseau became the 
operator of the French railway system (SNCF Réseau, 2017) 
 
Table 2: SNCF Financial profile  
 
 2017 2016 2015 
Revenue €33.5 billion €32.3 billion €29.2 billion 
EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, 
Tax and Amortization) 
€4.5 billion €4.1 billion €4.4 billion 
Investment grants relating to 
intangible assets and PPandE 
investments? 
€8.8 billion  €5.3? 8.6 
billion 
 
Net debt repayment value €46 billion €42 billion €39 billion 
Source: SNCF Group Annual Report 2016, 2018 
 
Although SNCF revenues and earnings before interest, tax and amortisation have risen since 2015, the 
indebtedness of SNCF Réseau has continued to growth.  
 
Until 2018, the French government has defined the overall goals and major upgrade projects as well 
as contributing to the financing of development and network renovation projects. French regional 
governments have a growing role in public transport and increasingly define financing policy. They 
provide a part of the financing for the network within the scope of the State-Region Project Contracts 
(SNCF, 2017).   Government investment continues to play an important role in the development of 
SNCF because the rail system is recognised as contributing to economic and social development.  The 
success of SNCF has enabled it to expand internationally, with partnerships and joint ventures.  
Urban, commuter and regional passenger transport provides 35% of the revenues.  
 
In 2017, the Macron government, as part of its reform programme, commissioned a report to 
investigate how the French railway system could be reformed so that continuing problems of 
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indebtedness and poor service could be addressed.  The Spinetta report identified the main problems 
of the rail system as poor performance, increasing costs and an unbalanced financing of the rail 
system resulting in growth debt. The main cause of these problems was an inconsistent and 
inadequate system of public governance which had resulted in poor investment and regeneration of 
the rail network (Spinetta, 2018). 
 
The main recommendations were: 
• SNCF Réseau should not invest at a loss and should operate better cost control; 
• Organising authorities should cover the full cost of infrastructure services; 
• SNCF Mobilities should be transformed into a public company with public capital; 
• Regional transport should be opened up to competition; 
• A new social contract with the trade unions should inform the reform of existing employment 
relations (Spinetta Report, 2018) 
 
These recommendations were approved by the French Senate in 2018, which included the French 
state taking over the accumulated debt of SNCF Réseau.  They show that the relationship between 
government and SNCF will change in future. 
 
4.3 Politics of rail SOEs 
France has a highly centralised planning system which supported a post-war process of 
nationalisation.  The progress of SNCF from a public-private partnership to SOE reflects how the rail 
sector has been seen as contributing to regional and economic growth.  By 1983, SNCF was 
nationalised and the government became the sole owner. However, the structure of SNCF has 
undergone changes which have been a response to an EU Directive as well as economic reforms. 
By 2018 there are recommendations for a further break-up of SNCF. 
 
Since 2015, the government reduced its investment grants to SNCF which was as a sign that future 
government support could not be depended on.  The Macron government introduced a wider 
programme of economic reforms.  One of the reasons for the Spinetta recommendations was the 
growing indebtedness of SNCF Réseau.  Although the French government has agreed to take over this 
debt, the requirement for SNCF Réseau to take control over investments and other authorities to fully 
cover the cost of infrastructure is an indication that the French state will not be willing to take on the 
debt in future. 
 
The international expansion of SNCF, as an SOE subject to corporatisation, has been dependent on 
the rail privatisation policies in many countries. Increasingly the company will be subject to 
competition within France on local and regional routes.      
 
These changes can be seen as part of a response to changes in the role of the State from supporter and 
financier of SNCF to a more cautious and business- focused approach to investment and cost control.  
The success of SNCF internationally will continue but the tension between the public interest in 
France and international expansion may affect its future. 
 
 
5. Germany 
 
5.1 Context of state-owned enterprises  
Germany has a different history of SOE creation to France, with stronger municipal ownership.  In the 
1920s several key industries were nationalised but this was followed by the privatisation of many key 
sectors in the 1930s, for example, steel, mining, banking, local public utilities, shipyards and railways 
(Bel, 2011).  Bel (2011) suggests that the Nazi party wanted to improve relationships with industrial 
owners through this privatisation policy.  It also provided resources for increased public expenditure 
and armaments expansion.   In the 1950s and 1960s there was some privatisation by the Adenauer 
government (Megginson, 2005). 
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Since 1990s as the role of the state changed from provider to guarantor of services, there have been 
changes in the legal basis for financial decisions on privatisation. The Federal Government is only 
allowed to hold SOE interests if there is an important strategic interest and these are reviewed 
regularly. The criteria for participation is set out in article 65 of Federal Code and these include an 
important federal interest, a purpose which cannot be reached in other ways and whether federal 
government has a degree of influence on the management.  Underlying these criteria is a form of 
public mission. 
 
Table 3: Germany SOEs showing number of employees and enterprises 
Key: Employees (enterprises) 
 
 Majority 
owned listed  
Minority 
owned listed 
Majority 
owned non 
listed 
Statutory 
corporations/ 
quasi 
corporations 
Total 
employment 
(% labour force) 
 
Total 
employees 
None 713,890 (3) 349,197 (71) 6 (1) 1, 063,093 
(100%)   
Manufacturing  -  2,268 (2)  2,268 (0.002%) 
Finance - 55,917 (1) 7,442 (12) 6 (1) 63,365 (6%) 
Telecoms - 229,686 (1) - - 229,686 (21.6%) 
Electricity and 
gas 
- - 3,013 (6) - 3,013 (0.3%) 
Transport - 428,287 (1) 289,615 (11) - 717,902 (67.5%) 
Other activities - - 37,858 (40) - 37,858 (3.6%) 
Source: OECD SOEs database (2017)  
 
There has been a process of privatisation or, most often, partial privatisation which has left the 
German state with some interests but not necessarily controlling interests.  Germany has about a 
million workers employed in three types of SOE, employed by government minority listed companies, 
majority non-listed and statutory corporations with a municipal management of SOEs.  67.5% of SOE 
workers are employed in the transport sector, an indication of how strategically significant transport is 
within the SOE sector.  In 2015, the federal government still had a 100% ownership of Deutsche Bahn 
(100%). 
 
The changes to the Federal Budget Code (2009) imply that, in addition to the annual report on federal 
government holdings, “not only members of the federal holding administration but also SOE 
managers (members of the managerial board) may be invited to appear before a specific parliamentary 
committee” (OECD, 2011). Federal government ownership is concentrated in the areas of science, 
infrastructure, administration/increasing efficiency, economic development, defence, development 
policy, culture, and property.  
 
5.2 Deutsche Bahn (DB) - development of a state-owned enterprise 
In 1994, the German Government decided to improve investment in the train and rail system in 
Germany and so reformed the rail system (Schaefer and Warm, 2015).  Deutsche Bahn AG was 
formed as a result of the merger of Deutsche Bundesbahn with Deutsche Reichsbahn. Deutsche Bahn 
(DB) AG is a private joint stock company with the Federal Government of Germany as the majority 
shareholder (DB, 2016).  
 
The relationship between the Federal government and Deutsche Bahn (DB) has changed over time.  
Although the initial motivation by government was to improve the rail system there has been a 
gradual tapering of financial support.  In the federal legislation, Article 87e((4) Basic Law highlights 
that in the process of providing/ facilitating the rail system it should “(Gemeinwohl) the common 
welfare” should be considered and regulated by federal law.  The German rail system was separated 
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into rail, track and stations in order to introduce competition into the system (OECD, 2011). About 
20% of the German rail services are now run by competitor companies.  An example of how DB is 
not protected from competition issues can be seen in the 2013 legislation on long distance coach 
services which opened up the market for long distance travel in Germany.  DB lost its monopoly but 
responded by offering cheaper tickets on long distance coach routes, which are not necessarily 
profitable.    
 
By 1999, DB AG had launched business units for long-distance, regional transport, freight transport, 
track and passenger stations.  It agreed a collective bargaining agreement with trade unions.  The 
Federal Government and DB AG invested €45 billion between 1994 and 1999 but government 
investment dropped by 17% between 1994 and 2012.  Income generated by the company has been 
reinvested.  Only by 2003 had the company reported an operating profit.   
 
The global expansion of DB AG has been managed through the introduction of innovation as well as 
the acquisition of companies outside Germany (Deutsche Bahn, 2013/6).  From 2002, DB AG started 
to acquire companies outside Germany as well as expanding into other forms of transport.  By 2012, 
DB AG had become a global company, operating in 130 countries, with operations in rail, bus, ship 
and air freight sectors. Rail services remain its core business, although logistics and freight rail are 
increasing the share of revenue.  As well as expanding internationally, the company is involved in 
developing new ways of linking different modes of transport together,  which is addressing 
environmental concerns as well as a way of dealing with greater competition.   
 
Table 5: Deutsche Bahn financial profile (€ billion) 
 
 2017 2016 2015 
Revenues €42.7  €40.5  €40.4  
EBITDA (Earnings 
before interest, taxes and 
amortization)  
€4.9  €4.7  €4.7  
Investment grants 
received 
€6.7  €6.1  €5.4  
Net financial debt €18.6 €17.6 €17.4 
Source: Deutsche Bahn Annual Report, 2016, 2017 
 
Deutsche Bahn revenues remained stable between 2015 and 2017.  There was a slight increase in the  
investment grant, received by Deutsche Bahn, from the Federal Government in the same period.   
Smaller investment grants also come from local governments and the European Union (DB, 2016).  
The net financial debt is increasingly slowly.  There is some growing discontent about the stand of 
services delivered by DB. In a similar way to France, the quality of services has been deteriorating 
and the investment in infrastructure required is growing (Connolly, 2018).   
 
5.3 Politics of rail SOEs 
Political and security issues influenced the German rail strategy for electrification, high speed rail and 
rolling stock because of the need to merge two different rail systems.  German unification influenced 
the decision to make Deutsche Bahn a commercial company funded with state subsidies. 
 
Deutsche Bahn is an example of a rail SOE which has received government investment for 20 years, 
since it was founded, and is now a global company.  However, it did not make an operating profit 
until 2002 although since 2009 DB has paid a dividend to the German government. Income generated 
by the company has since been reinvested.   
 
The reduction of the investment grant and the requirement for DB to pay a dividend to the German 
federal government is beginning to have an impact on infrastructure investment. A recent report found 
that German rail infrastructure needs more investment but it is not clear whose responsibility it should 
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be. As a successful global SOE could DB contribute the investment needed or should the Federal and 
regional governments? 
 
The global expansion of DB AG has been managed through the introduction of innovation to German 
railways as well as the acquisition of companies outside Germany.  The position of Germany in 
Europe, as well as Germany within the European Union, has meant that the EU proposals for 
integrated rail services in mainland Europe have provided opportunities for Deutsche Bahn to improve 
rail links within Germany and with neighbouring countries.   
 
SOEs play an important part in economic, social and strategic development in Germany. A mix of 
economic and social/ public missions interact with legislation.  The Basic Law plays an important role 
in influencing the politics of SOEs.  Yet, there is still discussion of privatisation or different forms of 
privatisation even if little action is taken. One argument is whether a company such as DB can both 
provide a public mission and be a profitable global company (Schaefer and Warm, 2015).    DB is an 
example of financial and political issues coexisting but the future issues of the international role of 
SOEs is still unresolved.   
 
 
6. United Kingdom (UK)  
 
6.1 Context of state-owned enterprises 
Political decisions had a fundamental influence on both the creation of SOEs in the period after the 
Second World War and the privatisation of many SOEs after 1979 by the Thatcher government.  
Government, at local and national level, created its own utilities companies in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century as it took over failing private utilities companies.  As in France, after the 
Second World War, many UK industries were nationalised in strategic sectors such as coal, iron and 
steel and rail as part of a programme of nationalisation led by the Labour government (1945-51).  
Florio (2004) argues that many of these industries had already been subject to some degree of state 
control during World War Two, so the decisions can be seen as political but also part of a national 
planning framework.   
 
After the election of the Conservative government in 1979, the government implemented policies of 
public sector reform and highlighted the inappropriateness and inefficiency of state-owned 
enterprises.  The adoption of privatisation and liberalisation policies for public utilities and other 
sectors were presented as solutions to these problems. There was an assumption that the private sector 
was more efficient than the public sector.  This resulted in a widespread privatisation programme and 
a dramatic reduction in the size of state-owned enterprise ownership by government, affecting water, 
energy, telecoms and many industrial enterprises.  Between 1979 and 1992 one million employees 
were transferred from the public to the private sector (Florio, 2004).    
 
Political attitudes to nationalisation were challenged in 2008 when the UK government had to 
nationalise two banks but this resulting in the government becoming the largest shareholder for both 
banks.  However, this did not result in the government taking a more active role in the management of 
these state-owned banks.  The policy of the Conservative-led coalition government between 2010 and 
2015 was to reduce the government shareholding of both banks.  During the June 2017 election 
campaign, the Labour Party successfully challenged the prevailing neo-liberal agenda by presenting a 
manifesto of nationalisation, fiscal policies and an increased role of the state in the economy.  The 
failure of several private companies which were supposed to be delivering public services has also 
increased public interest in the renationalisation of rail, water and energy.  
 
Table 7: UK SOEs showing number of employees and enterprises 
Key: Employees (enterprises) 
 
 Majority 
owned listed  
Minority 
owned listed 
 Majority 
owned non 
Statutory 
corporations/ 
Total 
employment 
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listed quasi 
corporations 
Total 
employees 
137,000 (1) 97,091 (1) 16,804 (11) 178,597 (5) 429,492 
(100%) 
Manufacturing  - - 941 (1) - 941 (0.2%) 
Finance 137,000 (1)
  
97,091 (1) 100 (1) - 234,191 
(54.5%) 
Telecoms - - - - - 
Electricity and 
gas and other 
utilities 
- - 0 (1) 176,000(1) 176,000 
(41%) 
Transport - - - - - 
Other activities - - 15,763 (8) 2,597 (4) 18,360 
(4%) 
Source: OECD database Size/sectoral distribution of SOEs in partnership countries 
 
Table 7 shows the largest state-owned enterprises are two banks within the financial services sector 
providing 54% of total SOE employment. There are several regional state-owned enterprises which 
play a key role in local economies, for example, water.  The UK is an example of a country where 
political attitudes towards privatisation and re-nationalisation are changing.  This is the result of the 
visible failure of privatisation in several strategic sectors, one of which is the rail industry.   
 
6.2 British Rail – from state-owned enterprise to privatisation 
British Railways was formed in 1948 with the nationalisation of four railway companies which 
provided services across the UK. From 1965 it was known as British Rail and privatised between 
1994 and 1997 following the passing of the Railways Act (1993). The company was privatised in two 
parts: lines and infrastructure (track, signals, bridge and tunnels).  Lines were offered as franchises to 
different companies.  A group of companies called Railtrack took over the track, signalling, tunnels, 
bridges, level crossings after privatisation.  The two major issues which continue to determine 
government involvement in the rail sector are infrastructure maintenance and investment and failure 
of the private sector to both run an acceptable standard of services and generate profits. 
 
The government response to two major crises after 1994 shows how government control of the 
industry is still the default position even after privatisation. The first crisis was a series of track 
maintenance failures, the responsibility of Railtrack, which resulted in train crashes and several 
deaths.  After the Hatfield crash in 2000, Railtrack, a private company, was declared bankrupt and the 
government created Network Rail, a non-profit company to maintain the rail infrastructure.  
 
The underlying problem with rail track maintenance is that it requires government subsidy to cover 
the extensive costs of maintaining a rail network.  It is not a conventional product which responds to 
market supply and demand (Williams et al, 2013). This is reflected in the financial position of 
Network Rail which receives an annual subsidy from government of £4 billion but has a growing 
annual deficit (Ames, 2017).  The effective subsidy helps to hide the extent that rail privatisation still 
depends on government expenditure and investment (Williams et al, 2013).       
 
Table 8: Network Rail financial results 2015-2017 
 
 2017 2016 2015 
Revenues £6, 580 million £6,259 million £6,098 million 
Pre-tax profit £48 million £483 million £411 million 
Net financial debt £51.2 billion £46.3 billion £41.6 billion 
Source: Network Rail Annual Reports, 2016-2017 
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The majority of Network Rail’s revenue is formed from a government grant (62 per cent), track access 
charges from train operators (34 per cent), and property and station retail income (4 per cent).  
Network Rail was redefined as a public sector organisation in September 2014 by the Office of 
National Statistics, due to new guidance in the European System of National Accounts 2010 (ESA10), 
therefore its debt is now classified as public sector debt (Network Rail, 2014: 5-6).  This will mean 
that debt will be funded through the public sector rather than Network Rail issuing bonds. This is a 
cheaper way of borrowing money than issuing bonds although at a time when it is government policy 
to reduce public spending Network Rail’s growing debt is also a government problem.  As Table 8 
shows, Network Rail has a growing debt which in 2017 was £51.2 billion. 
 
There are different interpretations of Network Rail’s financial position and its relation to the 
privatised rail companies which run train services. Bowman (2015) argues that the increasing 
government subsidy to Network Rail has enabled the rail industry to present privatisation as a success.  
Network Rail is a major employer, not just in terms of direct employment.  It is estimated that about 
100,000 workers are indirectly contracted for Network Rail work as well as the 38,000 directly 
employed workers. 
 
A second crisis occurred in 2009 when National Express, the company contracted to run rail services 
on the East Coast mainline, admitted it could not run the line on the terms it had agreed in 2007, 
which involving paying £1.4 billion to the UK Treasury by 2015.  National Express had taken over 
the service because GNER, the previous holder of the franchise had had its contract taken away 
because the parent company of GNER had financial problems (The Guardian, 2013).  
 
In response, the Labour government set up Directly Operated Railways, a not-for-dividend subsidiary 
of the Department for Transport, in 2009, to manage the service. Although this company was set up in 
order to take over the failing East Coast mainline services, there are several inactive subsidiary 
companies in case other rail franchises should fail, an indication of the uncertain future of the 
privatised industry. Between 2009 and 2015, the DOR reported annual improvements in punctuality 
and service delivery.   
 
The company had to operate with the assumption that its services would be tendered to the private 
sector again and this took place in 2015. The Labour government has been replaced by a Conservative 
led coalition government in 2010 which has an explicit goal of reducing the size of the public sector.   
In 2013, the government announced that it planned to return the East Coast mainline franchise to the 
private sector. In 2013, DOR was asked to develop a five year business plan which would cover the 
period until a private provider took over and immediately after.  At the same time the DOR 
announced that it had returned £640 million to the tax payer.  The company has had high levels of 
customer satisfaction and had achieved the highest operational performance since 1999. 1 
 
Just before the 2015 general election, the East Coast line was re-privatised and given as a joint 
venture to Stagecoach and Virgin Rail, companies which run other rail franchises.  By November 
2017, less than two years into their contract, they announced that they would be unable to pay the 
agreed amount to the government by 2023 because of a reduction in expected passengers.  The 
Department of Transport announced that it had agreed that to work in partnership with the companies 
to run the line but the companies will not be paying anything to government.  This arrangement will 
mean that government takes all the risk and companies running the franchise will be risk-free which 
raises the question of what is the purpose of the rail franchises (Wolmar, 2017).  This has caused a 
political storm with growing demands for renationalisation of the rail industry. 
 
In contrast, the rail industry in Northern Ireland has remained publicly owned even after the 
privatisation of the rail sector in England, Wales and Scotland in 1993.  It plays an important role in 
maintaining regional economic growth and contributes to social and economic cohesion. The 
Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company (NITHCo) was created by the Transport Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1967. Translink is a brand name used to describe the group and the parts of the group, the 
main parts of which are Metro, Ulsterbus and Northern Ireland Railways.  NITHCo board is 
14 
 
responsible to the Department for delivery of public transport services within government policy 
frameworks.  
 
However, NITHCo was the subject of an Inquiry into its commercial interests in 2013. As a public 
corporation it generated half its revenues from its commercialised activities. It had an annual turnover 
of £190 million with £100 million from commercial property investments.  MPs of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly questioned the Chairman and Chief Executive about the potential conflicts of a 
company receiving government subsidies, especially for rail, and the success of their commercial 
activities (Committee for Regional Development, 2013).  This shows some of the political conflicts 
that emerge when corporate institutions are both providing a public service and operating 
commercially, 
 
6.3 Politics of rail SOEs 
As seen in this analysis of the two main problems facing the rail sector, infrastructure development 
and the failure of the private sector to deliver services and generate profits, the main political 
responses are continued indirect forms of government support and short-term nationalisation. The 
politics of rail SOEs are not stable, swinging from privatisation to re-nationalisation and back to 
privatisation.  
 
The position of the government in relation to the growing debts of Network Rail is becoming 
increasingly unsustainable. With the reclassification of the debt as a public sector debt, this shows that 
there are contradictions in wider government policy which aims to reduce public sector borrowing.    
 
One interpretation of the growing indebtedness of Network Rail is that this hides the reality of the 
franchising system, which is failing to generate profits without government support. There have been 
several examples of where private companies have failed to deliver public rail services which they 
were contracted to provide but even repeated examples of private sector failure in the East Coast line 
only led to short-term privatisation. The case of the rail industry shows some of the tensions between 
the public interest and a continued political commitment to privatisation.  This has made public 
opinion and opposition parties more sympathetic to re-nationalisation.   
 
The limited rail SOEs in the UK have not expanded internationally.  However, some of the companies 
running franchises in Great Britain are French and German rail SOEs, which operate as corporatized 
SOEs. NITHCo in Northern is the only example of an SOE involved in commercial activities as well 
as delivering a public service and even it showed that there are conflicts between pursuing 
commercial activities and profits and providing a public service.      
 
 
7. China 
 
7.1 Context of state-owned enterprises  
SOEs have played an important role in Chinese economic and social development. In the 1990s there 
were attempts at reform which were the result of both internal and external influences.  Reflecting the 
pattern in other countries, the attempts at SOE reforms were accompanied by the creation of a 
regulatory body, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC), which was the top tier of the SOE structure. It drew up a performance monitoring 
and incentive system based on league tables which brought together financial performance and 
political and social objectives (Shi, 2007: 11). It also continued with its management functions and 
State control as owner and regulator.  The second tier consisted of SOE holding companies and the 
third tier was listed SOEs.  The aim was to strengthen domestic, institutional capacity and to change 
SOEs into shareholder focused firms. The World Bank was critical of this approach (Shi, 2007). 
 
These reforms have been subject to extensive debates.  Perhaps one significant view was that the 
reforms are really about changing the role of the state to become an owner of capital and shareholder 
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rather than a manager of SOEs.  In this way, the pressures on the Chinese state to change its role from 
manager/ provider to investor/ shareholder are similar to other countries, for example, Germany.   
 
The SOE sector has reduced its contribution to GDP, falling from 50% in 1998 to 25% in 2011.  The 
number of SOEs owned by central government has also fallen from 196 in 2003 to 115 in 2013 (Fan  
and Hope, 2013).  However, the larger SOEs have been transformed into more successful businesses 
and the Chinese state has encouraged SOEs to expand internationally.  A recent speech by Xi Jingping 
reported that he wanted to turn China into a “country of innovators” focusing on aerospace, 
cyberspace and transport as well as promising market access to foreign companies (Phillips, 2017).   
 
7.2 Chinese Railway Corporation(CR) – development of a state-owned enterprise 
In 2013, the Ministry of Railways, which had previously run the railways in China, was re-structured. 
China Railway (CR) or the China Railway Corporation was formed in 2013.  It is the national railway 
operator in the People's Republic of China and is regulated by the Ministry of Transport and the 
National Railway Administration. In a similar way to the reforms in France and Germany, China 
Railway (CR) was created after the separation of the administrative and commercial divisions of the 
rail system.  CR runs passenger and freight transport through several smaller companies.  
 
Table 6: China Railways 
 
 2015 
Revenue  CN¥ 916.258 billion 
Operating Income CN¥ 53.456 billion 
Net income CN¥ 32.355 billion 
Number of employees 2 million 
Source: China Railways, 2016 
 
However further forms of state corporatisation were introduced in 2015.  The State-owned China 
CNR Corporation Limited (CNR) and China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation 
Limited (CSR) announced in a joint statement on December 30, 2014 that they were to merge to form 
a single company—China Railway Stock Corp (CRRC) (Dodillet  2015).  As a sign of its new global 
reach, all existing national and international contracts were to be transferred to CRRC and the new 
company will control over 90% of the Chinese rail sector.   These two companies had been owned by 
the Chinese government since they were restructured in 2000 and have also pursued competitive 
strategies in the domestic Chinese rail industry (Dodillet, 2015).  Following the merger in 2015, the 
Chinese government has continued as owner, with strategic plans to continue international expansion.   
 
A recent development in the Chinese rail system is the expansion of a high-speed rail industry (Sun, 
2015).  This shows the approach of the Chinese government towards both the rail industry and the 
cultivation of technological innovation. As a response to the growing discrepancy between actual rail 
capacity and growing demand, the Chinese government over a period of twenty years, invested in new 
trains by using Chinese new technologies with some parts being imported. Since 2008, the strategy 
focused on the design and production of internationally competitive high speed trains, with the 
acquisition of some foreign companies and research institutes.  The key role that the Chinese 
government has played in this phase of rail development can be seen as a form of ‘entrepreneurial 
state’ (Mazzucato, 2013, Sun, 2015).   
 
7.3 Politics of rail SOEs  
Railways are seen as a strategic sector within China and as part of China’s global expansion.  The 
2015 merger of two train companies showed that a process of consolidation has taken place in the rail 
sector. Expanding rail production (trains and rail track) is part of a strategy to increase the most high 
technology skilled economic activities in contrast to much of China’s industrial and manufacturing 
activities which are relatively low in the value chain (Barron, 2015).  CRRC will also receive 
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investment from regional backers such as the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (China Railways, 2017). 
 
The example of Chinese Railways (CR) illustrates some similar dynamics to France and Germany, 
with pressure from the government to expand internationally as well as pressures to combine different 
functions within the rail industry.  
 
China has a much larger SOE sector which has played a key role in the development of China.  
However, it has also been subject to some of the same pressures to reform and privatise SOEs. 
Over the last thirty years, economic reforms have been introduced and they have affected SOEs and 
created a more consolidated sector.  There are indications that pressures to expand globally have 
influenced the continued expansion of rail SOEs and they are now playing an important role in 
China’s strategic global expansion.   
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The rail sector is an example of a public service which had extensive influence on economic, social 
and territorial development.  An examination of the politics of rail SOEs in four countries shows that 
they are linked to the changing role of the state in the economy but they also interface with wider 
public policy issues, such as employment, regional development and social inclusion.  The influence 
of national and regional politics has had an impact on the development of SOEs in the rail sector.  
One way of interpreting the politics of rail SOEs is to relate key issues to the changing role of the 
state in the economy. 
 
In France, Germany and China, the importance of rail as a strategic sector which requires government 
investment and support is recognised politically.  In the UK, although the rail sector has an impact 
economically and socially, governments have been less willing to recognise this through SOEs 
although the failure of the private sector to deliver public services in parts of the UK have pushed 
governments to consider re-nationalisation.   Public attitudes towards rail re-nationalisation show that 
public policies for SOEs have become part of debates in contemporary politics.   
 
However, some of the characteristics of the changing role of the state such as reduced investment in 
the public sector and a focus on reducing government debt are also playing a role in government – rail 
relations.  The issue of infrastructure investment featured in all four countries.  In the cases of France 
and Germany, current arrangements for government investment are being questioned at the same time 
the national rail systems require further investment.  In the UK, the way in which a not-for-profit 
company, Network Rail, is increasing its debt is a sign of the need for investment but privatised rail 
companies are not able to contribute because of their own running costs.  Nor are the companies 
required to do this, thus protecting their limited profits.  In China, infrastructure investment is part of 
a global expansion strategy of which the rail sector is playing a part.  
 
Public policies to promote competition also play a significant role in shaping the politics of SOEs in 
the rail sector.  In Germany, Deutsche Bahn has been subject to some competition.  In France, 
competition has been introduced on long distance routes but the recent Spinetta Report recommended 
the introduction of competition to local and regional railways, which had previously been exempt.  
This has now been approved by the central government.  In the UK, the drive for continued 
competition has resulted in failures of the private sector to deliver mainline service contracts yet this 
has still not led to long-term re-nationalisation. 
 
Territorial security and economic development have both shaped government policies towards SOEs.  
The creation of the German rail SOE was strongly influenced by the unification of Germany after 
1990.  The continued existence of state-run railways in Northern Ireland show how even in a strongly 
pro-privatisation context such as the UK, the influence of regional security and cohesion could 
overcome privatisation policies.  
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All four countries examined in this chapter acknowledge the public mission that SOEs are expected to 
adhere to but they have also been subject to corporatisation and marketization pressures.  This 
emerges most clearly when rail SOEs have become successful operators in international markets. 
Both France and Germany have grown through international expansion and have a strong corporate 
identity in the rail sector globally.  SOEs which have entered global markets are experiencing some 
tensions between their public purpose and global expansion.  This is one of the biggest issues to affect 
the politics of rail SOEs in future.   
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